Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence

Arbeitspapier

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 218

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
• Thema: IMF conditionality ; delegation ; communication ; panel data ; Anpassungsprogramm des IWF ; Asymmetrische Information ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Theorie ; Schätzung ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Marchesi, Silvia ; Sabani, Laura ; Dreher, Axel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005778388
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50333
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ