Artikel
An individual manipulability of positional voting rules
We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 431-446 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
manipulability
positional voting rules
multiple choice
extended preferences
Abstimmungsregel
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aleskerov, Fuad
Karabekyan, Daniel
Sanver, M. Remzi
Yakuba, Vyacheslav
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Aleskerov, Fuad
- Karabekyan, Daniel
- Sanver, M. Remzi
- Yakuba, Vyacheslav
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2011
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