Artikel

The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates

Unemployment benefits reduce incentives to search for a job. Policymakers have responded to this behavior by setting minimum job search requirements, by monitoring to check that unemployment benefit recipients are engaged in the appropriate level of job search activity, and by imposing sanctions for infractions. Empirical studies consistently show that job search monitoring and benefit sanctions reduce unemployment duration and increase job entry in the short term. However, there is some evidence that longer-term effects of benefit sanctions may be negative.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: IZA World of Labor ; ISSN: 2054-9571 ; Year: 2020 ; Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Classification
Wirtschaft
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
Subject
unemployment
job search
sanctions
monitoring

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
McVicar, Duncan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.15185/izawol.49.v2
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • McVicar, Duncan
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2020

Other Objects (12)