Artikel
The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates
Unemployment benefits reduce incentives to search for a job. Policymakers have responded to this behavior by setting minimum job search requirements, by monitoring to check that unemployment benefit recipients are engaged in the appropriate level of job search activity, and by imposing sanctions for infractions. Empirical studies consistently show that job search monitoring and benefit sanctions reduce unemployment duration and increase job entry in the short term. However, there is some evidence that longer-term effects of benefit sanctions may be negative.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: IZA World of Labor ; ISSN: 2054-9571 ; Year: 2020 ; Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
- Thema
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unemployment
job search
sanctions
monitoring
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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McVicar, Duncan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
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doi:10.15185/izawol.49.v2
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- McVicar, Duncan
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2020