Artikel

The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates

Unemployment benefits reduce incentives to search for a job. Policymakers have responded to this behavior by setting minimum job search requirements, by monitoring to check that unemployment benefit recipients are engaged in the appropriate level of job search activity, and by imposing sanctions for infractions. Empirical studies consistently show that job search monitoring and benefit sanctions reduce unemployment duration and increase job entry in the short term. However, there is some evidence that longer-term effects of benefit sanctions may be negative.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: IZA World of Labor ; ISSN: 2054-9571 ; Year: 2020 ; Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
Thema
unemployment
job search
sanctions
monitoring

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
McVicar, Duncan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.15185/izawol.49.v2
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • McVicar, Duncan
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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