Arbeitspapier
To Merge or to License: Implications for Competition Policy
The optimal merger policy when efficiency gains are not merger specific but can also be achieved through licensing is derived in a differentiated goods Cournot duopoly. We show that whenever both royalties and fees are feasible instruments to license technology, mergers should not be allowed, which fits the prescription of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. When only one instrument is feasible, however, the possibility of licensing cannot be used as a definitive argument against mergers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1284
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fauli-Oller, Ramon
Sandonis, Joel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fauli-Oller, Ramon
- Sandonis, Joel
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2000
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