Arbeitspapier
Waiting to merge
We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three distinct motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2008,13
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Thema
-
Fusion
Spieltheorie
Unvollkommener Markt
Konzentrationspolitik
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fumagalli, Eileen
Nilssen, Tore
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fumagalli, Eileen
- Nilssen, Tore
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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