Arbeitspapier

Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing : A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics

The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2004/14

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Thema
Optimal Income Taxation
Public Goods
Public-Sector Pricing
Multidimensional Mechanism Design
Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing
Optimale Besteuerung
Öffentliches Gut
Ramsey-Preis
Gebühr
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hellwig, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hellwig, Martin
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2004

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