Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice

Arbeitspapier

We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions and demonstrate that sellers refuse to offer posted prices as long as (risk-neutral) buyers do not differ with respect to their transaction costs in both trade institutions. If some buyers have lower transaction costs when trading at a posted price, it is optimal for sellers to offer posted prices if and only if they have a sufficiently high reservation value. We develop an econometric technique to compare the selling probabilities and revenues of posted prices and auctions and confirm our theoretical predictions with data from the EURO 2008 European Football Championship.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2014-28

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Competing Sellers ; Single-Crossing ; Auctions ; Fixed Prices

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Feess, Eberhard ; Grund, Christian ; Walzl, Markus ; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
• (wo): Innsbruck
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122222
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ