Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation

Arbeitspapier

In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-036/VI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Auctions ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: search frictions ; matching function ; meeting technology ; competing mechanisms ; heterogeneity

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cai, Xiaoming ; Gautier, Pieter ; Wolthoff, Ronald
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145343
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ