Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority

Arbeitspapier

In models of dynamic multilateral bargaining, the literature tends to focus on stationary subgame perfect or stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which restrict attention to forward-looking, history-independent strategies. Evidence supporting such refinements come from environments in which proposal power is exogenous and the incentives for players to develop cooperative relationships are minimized. However, in many environments including legislative bargaining, agenda setting power is endogenous and it is common place for players to form coalitions and establish reputations. Through a series of lab experiments, we show that in repeated environments, standard equilibrium refinements may predict some aspects of the data when outcomes when proposal power is randomly assigned, but do not predict outcomes when proposal power is endogenous.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1414

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: stationary equilibrium ; dynamic bargaining ; repeated games ; laboratory experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Agranov, Marina ; Cotton, Christopher ; Tergiman, Chloe
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230567