Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining

Artikel

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-25 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: bargaining ; gender differences ; laboratory experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Maaser, Nicola ; Paetzel, Fabian ; Traub, Stefan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2022

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g13010011
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/257588
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET