Artikel

Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-25 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
bargaining
gender differences
laboratory experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Maaser, Nicola
Paetzel, Fabian
Traub, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.3390/g13010011
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Maaser, Nicola
  • Paetzel, Fabian
  • Traub, Stefan
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2022

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