Arbeitspapier
Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), arbitrary specifications of patience or impatience (geometric, hyperbolic, or otherwise), externalities, multiple selves, and other-regarding preferences.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IHS Economics Series ; No. 332
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
bargaining
equilibrium existence
infinite-horizon games
subgame perfection
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Ritzberger, Klaus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (wo)
-
Vienna
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
- Ritzberger, Klaus
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 2017