Search and Matching in Political Corruption

Abstract: We develop a search and matching model to analyze the dynamics of the political corruption market. This model serves as a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of a set of anti-corruption policies. Contrary to expectations, conventional policies such as enhancing penalties or allocating greater resources to criminal investigations do not universally emerge as the most effective tools. For mitigating small-scale political corruption, the optimal strategy is to curtail corruption signaling, achieved, for instance, through enhancing transparency and competitiveness in the exchanges between entrepreneurs and politicians. For large-scale corruption, raising the costs of corruption signaling proves less effective as a deterrent compared to ex-post policy measures, such as improved detection effectiveness and harsher sanctions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Search and Matching in Political Corruption ; volume:24 ; number:1 ; year:2023 ; pages:69-96 ; extent:28 ; The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy ; 24, Heft 1 (2023), 69-96 (gesamt 28)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Lisciandra, Maurizio ; Miralles Asensio, Antonio ; Monteforte, Fabio

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2023-0022
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2024012513305244770237
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.04.2024, 07:04 MESZ