Corruption and Political Competition

Arbeitspapier

There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2008-7

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
• Subject: Corruption ; lobbying ; political competition ; Korruption ; Interessenpolitik ; Wahlkampf ; Public Choice ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Damania, Richard ; Yalcýn, Erkan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17979
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET