Inverse campaigning

Abstract: "It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Alternative title: Inverse Wirkungen von Kampagnen
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 17 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-29

Classification and Topics

• Keyword: Konflikt ; Signaling ; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie ; Wahlverhalten ; Theorie ; Wahlkampf

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2002
• Creator: Konrad, Kai A.
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-113078
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:57 PM CET