Arbeitspapier
Acquisition for Sleep
Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms' inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such "acquisitions for sleep" can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8095
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
New Firms; Startups
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
- Subject
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acquisitions
innovation
sleeping patents
IP law
ownership
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Olofsson, Charlotta
Persson, Lars
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
- Olofsson, Charlotta
- Persson, Lars
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2020