Arbeitspapier

Gains from multinational competition for crossborder firm acquisition

This study shows that when there is multinational competition for foreign acquisition, the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry leads to a preemptive foreign acquisition. Even under fierce competition, foreign acquisition will emerge as part of a non-cooperative equilibrium (although multinationals would have gained more had they been able to credibly commit to a cooperative equilibrium of independent foreign sales, either via greenfield investment or trade under complete liberalization) which increases local welfare by more than both the case without foreign market entry and the case with foreign market entry via independent foreign sales.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2018-19

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
cross-border firm acquisitions
foreign market entry regulations
greenfield investment
trade
consumer welfare

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koska, Onur A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koska, Onur A.
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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