Arbeitspapier
Gains from multinational competition for crossborder firm acquisition
This study shows that when there is multinational competition for foreign acquisition, the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry leads to a preemptive foreign acquisition. Even under fierce competition, foreign acquisition will emerge as part of a non-cooperative equilibrium (although multinationals would have gained more had they been able to credibly commit to a cooperative equilibrium of independent foreign sales, either via greenfield investment or trade under complete liberalization) which increases local welfare by more than both the case without foreign market entry and the case with foreign market entry via independent foreign sales.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2018-19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Thema
-
cross-border firm acquisitions
foreign market entry regulations
greenfield investment
trade
consumer welfare
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koska, Onur A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koska, Onur A.
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2018