Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary norm enforcement
Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of truly trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1999,84
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Güth, Werner
Ockenfels, Axel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046711
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Ockenfels, Axel
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 1999
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Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats: The concept of ecological stability
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment