Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary norm enforcement
Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of truly trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1999,84
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Ockenfels, Axel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046711
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Ockenfels, Axel
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 1999
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats: The concept of ecological stability
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats: The concept of ecological stability
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats: The concept of ecological stability
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations