Arbeitspapier

The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence

to connected objects

We study the long-term and dynamic relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence using a large panel dataset covering 50 countries over a period of 50 years. Our analysis shows a negative relationship between these variables, a sharp contrast to the prevailing theoretical view in the literature. However, the magnitude of the relationship is small. The negative association between the two variables is driven by OECD countries, whereas a positive one can be found for non-OECD countries. We discover no evidence of reverse causality running from de facto to de jure judicial independence.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 18

Classification: Recht
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

Subject: Judicial independence
de facto
de jure
long-term panel data analysis
cointegration
Granger causality

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)

(where): Hamburg

(when): 2018

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/184855

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Show original at data provider

Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)

Time of origin

2018

Other Objects (12)

Explaining de facto judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining de facto judicial independence

Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?

Arbeitspapier

Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?

The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey

Arbeitspapier

Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Arbeitspapier

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Arbeitspapier

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t

Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t

Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Arbeitspapier

Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

Konferenzbeitrag

Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

Explaining de facto judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining de facto judicial independence

Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?

Arbeitspapier

Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?

The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey

Arbeitspapier

Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Arbeitspapier

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Arbeitspapier

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t

Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t

Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Arbeitspapier

Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

Konferenzbeitrag

Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

Explaining de facto judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining de facto judicial independence

Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?

Arbeitspapier

Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?

The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey

Arbeitspapier

Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Arbeitspapier

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Arbeitspapier

The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth

Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t

Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t

Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Arbeitspapier

Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?

Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

Konferenzbeitrag

Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

Cultural heritage institutions wishing to register will find more information here.

Fields marked * need to be filled in.

Username*

Please enter your username

Email*

Please enter your email address

Please do not fill this field

First name

Last name

Password*

Please enter your password

Confirm password*

Please enter the same password

I have read the terms of use and the privacy policy for the collection of personal data and accept them. *

This field is required.

I would like to subscribe to the newsletter of the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek. See newsletter subscription info.

Account created

Your "My DDB" account has been successfully created. Before you can log in to your account, you must click the confirmation link in the message we just sent to the email address you provided.