Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU

Arbeitspapier

Governments in the EU frequently bail out firms in distress by granting state aid. I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine two issues: the impact of bailouts on bankruptcy probability and the determinants of bailout policy. I have three main results. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. The number of failing bailouts could be reduced if European control was tougher. Second, governments’ bailout decisions favored public firms, even though public firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate. Treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2006-05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: State aid ; European Union ; Discrete-time hazard ; Bivariate probit

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Glowicka, Ela
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51041
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET