Arbeitspapier

Are bank bailouts welfare improving?

The financial sector bailouts seen during the Great Recession generated substantial opposition and controversy. We assess the welfare benefits of government-funded emergency support to the financial sector, taking into account its effects on risk-taking incentives. In our quantitative general equilibrium model, the financial crisis probability depends on financial intermediaries' balance sheet choices, influenced by capital adequacy constraints and ex ante known emergency support provisions. These policy tools interact to make financial sector bailouts welfare improving when capital adequacy constraints are consistent with the current Basel III regulation, but potentially welfare decreasing with looser capital adequacy regulation existing before the Great Recession.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2021-56

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Externalities
Financial Crises
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Thema
Financial system regulations and policies
Financial institutions
Financial stability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Shukayev, Malik
Ueberfeldt, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2021-56
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Shukayev, Malik
  • Ueberfeldt, Alexander
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2021

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