Arbeitspapier

In it to win it: Experimental evidence on unique bid auctions

We examine bidding motives in discrete-point unique bid auctions in a laboratory setting. In lowest (highest) unique bid auctions, the participant with the lowest (highest) unique bid wins the auction. We posit two sets of motives in this type of auctions - a winning motive that is driven by the desire to win and a profit motive that is driven by the expected payoff. In the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), the profit and winning motive lead to the same bidding strategy in equilibrium. In the highest unique bid auction (HUBA), the profit and winning motive lead to different bidding strategies in equilibrium. Using a utility-based choice framework, we identify and characterize the motives. Our findings suggest that bidders' behavior is driven by an array of motives. We find that not only does the winning motive play a key role in behavior, but other considerations such as reinforcement and coordination enter as well.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe ; No. B-20-16

Klassifikation
Management
Thema
unique bid auctions
bidding behavior
experiment
learning

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baethge, Caroline
Fiedler, Marina
Haruvey, Ernan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
Passau
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baethge, Caroline
  • Fiedler, Marina
  • Haruvey, Ernan
  • Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2016

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