Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions

Artikel

I introduce a new framework to study environments with both structural and strategic uncertainty, different from Harsanyi's (1967-8) `Bayesian games', that allows a researcher to test the robustness of Nash predictions while maintaining certain desirable restrictions on players' beliefs. The solution concept applied to this environment is rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE), which integrates both learning from feedback (in the spirit of self-confirming equilibrium) and from introspection (in the spirit of rationalizability). I provide an epistemic definition of RCE and obtain a characterization in terms of a procedure that generalizes iterated deletion of strategies that are not a best response.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 467-501 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Rationalizability ; self-confirming equilibrium ; epistemic framework ; robust equilibrium predictions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Esponda, Ignacio
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE928
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150198
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ