Cooperation against all predictions

Artikel

In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non-cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four-player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k < n, the selected equilibria clearly differ from experimental behavior. We interpret our observations by suggesting the concept Behavioral Equilibrium Selection.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Economic Inquiry ; ISSN: 1465-7295 ; Volume: 59 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 904-924 ; Boston, USA: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: equilibrium selection ; experiments ; global games ; payoff dominance ; quantal response equilibria ; risk dominance ; Stag Hunt games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bolle, Friedel ; Spiller, Jörg
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
• (where): Boston, USA
• (when): 2021

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1111/ecin.12976
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242002
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET