Artikel
Population games, stable games, and passivity
The class of 'stable games', introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a 'passive' dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 561-583 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
population games
evolutionary games
passivity theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fox, Michael J.
Shamma, Jeff S.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/g4040561
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Fox, Michael J.
- Shamma, Jeff S.
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2013
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