Artikel
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 299-317 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Public Goods
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Thema
-
common pool resource games
experiments
sampling equilibrium
quantal response equilibrium
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Camilo Cárdenas, Juan
Mantilla, César
Sethi, Rajiv
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g6030299
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Camilo Cárdenas, Juan
- Mantilla, César
- Sethi, Rajiv
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2015
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