Artikel

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 299-317 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Public Goods
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Thema
common pool resource games
experiments
sampling equilibrium
quantal response equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Camilo Cárdenas, Juan
Mantilla, César
Sethi, Rajiv
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3390/g6030299
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Camilo Cárdenas, Juan
  • Mantilla, César
  • Sethi, Rajiv
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)