Arbeitspapier
A dynamic theory of random price discounts
A seller with commitment power sets prices over time. Risk-averse buyers arrive to the market and decide when to purchase. We obtain that the optimal price path is a "regular" price, with occasional episodes of sequential discounts that occur at random times. The optimal price path has the property that the price a buyer ends up paying is independent of his arrival and purchase times, and only depends on his valuation. Our theory accommodates empirical findings on the timing of discounts.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 191
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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dynamic pricing
sales
random mechanisms
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dilmé, Francesc
Garrett, Daniel F.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
- (wo)
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Bonn and Cologne
- (wann)
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2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dilmé, Francesc
- Garrett, Daniel F.
- University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
Entstanden
- 2022