Arbeitspapier

Bank capital regulation in a zero interest environment

How do near-zero interest rates affect optimal bank capital regulation and risk-taking? I study this question in a dynamic model, in which forward-looking banks compete imperfectly for deposit funding, but households do not accept negative deposit rates. When deposit rates are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), tight capital requirements disproportionately hurt franchise values and become less effective in curbing excessive risk-taking. As a result, optimal dynamic capital requirements vary with the level of interest rates if the ZLB binds occasionally. Higher in ation and unconventional monetary policy can alleviate the problem, though their overall welfare effects are ambiguous.

ISBN
978-92-899-4065-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2422

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Thema
Zero lower bound
search for yield
capital regulation
franchise value
unconventional monetary policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Döttling, Robin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.2866/123040
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Döttling, Robin
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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