Arbeitspapier

Bank Capital Regulation in a Zero Interest Environment

How do near-zero deposit rates affect (optimal) bank capital regulation and risk taking? I study these questions in a tractable, dynamic equilibrium model, in which forward-looking banks compete imperfectly for deposit funding, subject to a (zero) lower bound constraint on deposit rates (ZLB). At the ZLB, capital requirements become less effective in curbing excessive risk-taking incentives, as they disproportionately hurt franchise values. As a consequence, optimal dynamic capital requirements vary with the level of interest rates if the ZLB binds occasionally. Subsidizing bank funding costs at the ZLB dampens risk-taking, but may reduce overall welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Thema
Zero lower bound
Search for yield
Capital regulation
Bank competition
Franchise value

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Döttling, Robin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Döttling, Robin
  • ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Entstanden

  • 2019

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