Arbeitspapier
Bank Capital Regulation in a Zero Interest Environment
How do near-zero deposit rates affect (optimal) bank capital regulation and risk taking? I study these questions in a tractable, dynamic equilibrium model, in which forward-looking banks compete imperfectly for deposit funding, subject to a (zero) lower bound constraint on deposit rates (ZLB). At the ZLB, capital requirements become less effective in curbing excessive risk-taking incentives, as they disproportionately hurt franchise values. As a consequence, optimal dynamic capital requirements vary with the level of interest rates if the ZLB binds occasionally. Subsidizing bank funding costs at the ZLB dampens risk-taking, but may reduce overall welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- Thema
-
Zero lower bound
Search for yield
Capital regulation
Bank competition
Franchise value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Döttling, Robin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Döttling, Robin
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 2019