Job search costs and incentives

Arbeitspapier

The costs of searching for a job vacancy are typically associated with friction that deters or delays employment of potentially productive individuals. We demonstrate that in a labor market with moral hazard where effort is noncontractible, job search costs play a positive role, whose effect may outweigh the negative implications. As workers are provided incentives to exert effort by the threat of losing their job and having to search for a new vacancy, a reduction in job search costs leads to fewer employees willing to exert effort. The overall lower productivity will make more individuals and firms opting to stay out of the labor market, resulting in lower employment and decreased welfare. Eventually, a reduction of jobs search costs below a certain level results in collapse of the labor market.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 693

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: Job search ; Moral hazard ; Labor market ; Unemployment insurance

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Zultan, Ro'i
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97341
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ