Arbeitspapier

Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives

This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 5/2008

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Thema
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Job Assignments
Anforderungsprofil
Leistungsmotivation
Leistungsanreiz
Agency Theory
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nafziger, Julia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nafziger, Julia
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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