Arbeitspapier
Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems
This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-182/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Cooperative TU-game
Union stable system
Harsanyi dividend
Power measure
Harsanyi power solution
Myerson value
Position value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Algaba, Encarnacion
Bilbao, Jesus Mario
van den Brink, Rene
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Algaba, Encarnacion
- Bilbao, Jesus Mario
- van den Brink, Rene
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints
Interval Solutions for Tu-games
But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others
Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems
Harsanyi Solutions in Line-graph Games
The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games
On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games
Bias Correction in a Stable AD(1,1) Model
Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints
Interval Solutions for Tu-games
But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others
Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems
Harsanyi Solutions in Line-graph Games
The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games
On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games
Bias Correction in a Stable AD(1,1) Model
Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints
Interval Solutions for Tu-games
But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others
Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems
Harsanyi Solutions in Line-graph Games
The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games
On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games
Bias Correction in a Stable AD(1,1) Model