Arbeitspapier
Interval Solutions for Tu-games
Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game a vector of payoff intervals. Since the solution we propose uses marginal vectors of the interval game, we need to apply a difference operator on intervals. Applying the subtraction operator of Moore (1979), we define an interval solution for TU-games, and we provide an axiomatization.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 17-094/II
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Cooperative TU-game
interval game
Moore subtraction
Moore-Shapley interval solution
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van den Brink, Rene (J.R.)
Palanci, Osman
Gok, S. Zeynep Alparslan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van den Brink, Rene (J.R.)
- Palanci, Osman
- Gok, S. Zeynep Alparslan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2017
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