Arbeitspapier
A decentralization theorem of taxation
In the EU there are longstanding and ongoing pressures towards a tax that is levied on the EU level to substitute for national contributions. We discuss conditions under which such a transition can make sense, starting from what we call a "decentralization theorem of taxation" that is analogous to Oates (1972) famous result that in the absence of spill-over effects and economies of scale decentralized public good provision weakly dominates central provision. We then drop assumptions that turn out to be unnecessary for this results. While spill-over effects of taxation may call for central rules for taxation, as long as spill-over effects do not depend on the intra-regional distribution of the tax burden, decentralized taxation plus tax coordination is found superior to a union-wide tax.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 105
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
fiscal federalism
taxing rights
decentralization theorem
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lipatov, Vilen
Weichenrieder, Alfons J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2607967
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-374507
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lipatov, Vilen
- Weichenrieder, Alfons J.
- Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
Entstanden
- 2015
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