The political economics of higher education finance for mobile individuals

Arbeitspapier

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Non-students are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher education costs or whether to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibrium, in both regions a majority votes for subsidies when the return probability is sufficiently small. When that probability is large, both regions opt for full tuition finance. Interestingly, the higher the return probability, the smaller are the equilibrium subsidy rates, but the larger are the numbers of exchange students.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3877

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Education ; Publicly Provided Private Goods ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: voting ; higher education ; financing scheme ; mobility ; Studienfinanzierung ; Hochschulfinanzierung ; Wahlverhalten ; Public Choice ; Studierende ; Auslandsaufenthalt ; Internationale Wanderung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Borck, Rainald ; Uebelmesser, Silke ; Wimbersky, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61002
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET