Political economics of higher education finance

Arbeitspapier

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2829

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Education ; Publicly Provided Private Goods ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: voting ; higher education ; financing scheme ; Studienfinanzierung ; Hochschulfinanzierung ; Vergleich ; Wahlverhalten ; Public Choice ; Spieltheorie ; Bildungsverhalten ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Borck, Rainald ; Wimbersky, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30670
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ