Central versus Local Education Finance: A Political Economy Approach

Arbeitspapier

This paper models voters' preferences over central versus local education policies when there are private alternatives. Education is financed by income taxes and individuals are mobile between communities. Public education levels are chosen by majority vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may benefit the rich and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised education. The model is also extended to include peer effects. Peer effects increase the support for central school finance, even in the community with good public schools.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 565

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Educational Finance; Financial Aid ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures
• Subject: education ; centralisation ; private schools ; majority voting

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Borck, Rainald
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18458
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET