Waiting to merge

Arbeitspapier

We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three distinct motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2008,13

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Subject: Fusion ; Spieltheorie ; Unvollkommener Markt ; Konzentrationspolitik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fumagalli, Eileen ; Nilssen, Tore
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47319
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET