Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining

Artikel

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-17 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: multilateral bargaining ; one-dimensional ; multiple equilibria ; time preference

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cardona, Daniel ; Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2016

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g7020012
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167975