Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Artikel

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. A sufficient condition for our gradient restriction is that the gradients of all players' utilities are linearly independent at that alternative. When the dimensionality of the set of alternatives is high, this linear independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This implies that constructive techniques, which are common in the literature, fail to identify many plausible outcomes in dynamic bargaining games.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 505-525 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Legislative bargaining ; endogenous status quo ; Markovian equilibrium ; simple solution

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Anesi, Vincent ; Duggan, John
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2018

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2215
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197154
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET