Artikel

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. A sufficient condition for our gradient restriction is that the gradients of all players' utilities are linearly independent at that alternative. When the dimensionality of the set of alternatives is high, this linear independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This implies that constructive techniques, which are common in the literature, fail to identify many plausible outcomes in dynamic bargaining games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 505-525 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Legislative bargaining
endogenous status quo
Markovian equilibrium
simple solution

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Anesi, Vincent
Duggan, John
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2215
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Anesi, Vincent
  • Duggan, John
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2018

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