Arbeitspapier
Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel & Moldovanu (1995a) by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2006:29
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Externalities
- Thema
-
ANC
Bargaining
externalities
delay
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Björnerstedt, Jonas
Westermark, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-211154
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Björnerstedt, Jonas
- Westermark, Andreas
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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