Arbeitspapier

Cooperative bargaining to internalise open access externalities: Implications of the American fisheries act

The United States Congress recently passed a law that creates an alternative to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. The American Fisheries Act promises the ability to rationalise one of the world's largest fisheries, the North Pacific pollock fishery, without the overt appearance of allocating permanent property rights to a public resource. The Act enabled pollock fishers to form cooperative bargaining units that are guaranteed a fixed share of the total allowable catch providing they deliver to historic processors. This paper explores the political economy of policy change and the innovative use of fishery cooperatives to advance voluntary decapitilisation and rationalisation that Congress intended to benefit both vessels and processors. Game theory offers insights into the likelihood of achieving congressional intent. It is argued that the Act introduces a new market failure while attempting to rid the fishery of the open access externality. It is further argued that outcomes of voluntary agreements, whether targeting environmental concerns or natural resource management, are sensitive to market structure and institutional contexts.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 75. 2000

Classification
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Subject
Voluntary fishery cooperatives
rationalisation
non-cooperative game
market failure
Fischerei
Gemeingüter
Genossenschaft
Kooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
USA

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Matulich, Scott C.
Sever, Murat
Inaba, Fred
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Matulich, Scott C.
  • Sever, Murat
  • Inaba, Fred
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2000

Other Objects (12)