A Hybrid Account of Scientific Progress: Finding Middle Ground Between the Epistemic and the Noetic Accounts

Abstract: Whereas the progressive nature of science is widely recognised, specifying the standards of scientific progress has been subject to philosophical debate since the enlightenment. Recently, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Alexander Bird, and Finnur Dellsfien have revived this debate by setting forward a semantic, epistemic and noetic ac- count of scientific progress respectively. I argue that none of these accounts is satisfactory. The semantic and epistemic accounts might advance necessary conditions for scientific progress, namely an accumulation of true, justified, and non-Gettiered beliefs, but fail to specify sufficient conditions. The noetic account, in contrast, advances sufficient conditions for scientific progress, namely an increase of genuine understanding, but fails to specify the necessary conditions. To remedy these deficits, I advance a hybrid account of scientific progress between the epistemic and noetic accounts, according to which the accumulation of explanatorily or predictively powerful knowledge constitutes scientific progress. In contrast to the epistemic account, my account ensures that only scientifically relevant knowledge constitutes scientific progress, thereby evading the threat of underdemandingness. In contrast to the noetic account, my account does not impose a psychological requirement of grasping the explanatory or predictive power of a scientific development, thereby evading the threat of overdemandingness. A further advantage of my account is that it can preserve plausible features of the noetic account.

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
A Hybrid Account of Scientific Progress: Finding Middle Ground Between the Epistemic and the Noetic Accounts ; volume:33 ; number:3 ; year:2019 ; pages:1-16 ; extent:16
Kriterion ; 33, Heft 3 (2019), 1-16 (gesamt 16)

Urheber
Goebel, Clara

DOI
10.1515/krt-2019-330304
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090315122124737107
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Goebel, Clara

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