- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1874-6349
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths ; day:4 ; month:7 ; year:2018 ; pages:1-22
Acta analytica ; (4.7.2018), 1-22
- Klassifikation
-
Philosophie
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s12136-018-0360-9
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018091213164878850578
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:28 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Collin, James Henry
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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