Arbeitspapier
Capital tax competition and household mobility
Capital tax competition is analyzed in a model with a single private and a locally supplied public consumption good. As a benchmark case necessary conditions for efficient interregional tax structures are derived and contrasted with the outcome of beggar thy neighbor strategies. If households are immobile an intervention of a central government can be justified to raise efficiency of the NASH equilibrium. In contrast, NASH equilibria are efficient if households are imperfectly mobile because regions have incentives to ensure an efficient interregional resource allocation via granting interregional transfer payments.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 289
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Kapitalertragsteuer
Steuerwettbewerb
Lokale öffentliche Güter
Binnenwanderung
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Eggert, Wolfgang
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (where)
-
Konstanz
- (when)
-
1995
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eggert, Wolfgang
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 1995