Arbeitspapier

Capital tax competition and household mobility

Capital tax competition is analyzed in a model with a single private and a locally supplied public consumption good. As a benchmark case necessary conditions for efficient interregional tax structures are derived and contrasted with the outcome of beggar thy neighbor strategies. If households are immobile an intervention of a central government can be justified to raise efficiency of the NASH equilibrium. In contrast, NASH equilibria are efficient if households are imperfectly mobile because regions have incentives to ensure an efficient interregional resource allocation via granting interregional transfer payments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 289

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Kapitalertragsteuer
Steuerwettbewerb
Lokale öffentliche Güter
Binnenwanderung
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eggert, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
(where)
Konstanz
(when)
1995

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eggert, Wolfgang
  • Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 1995

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