Arbeitspapier
Capital tax competition with three tax instruments
The paper studies the role of capital mobility for efficiency of decentralized fiscal policies in a tax competition model where only a distorting wage, the residencebased and the source-based capital tax are available. We extend Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) in deriving second-best taxation rules for small and large countries for each of the four possible combinations of tax instruments both in environments with an unconstrained and with a constrained set of tax instruments available to fiscal authorities. Whereas the model reproduces the result that countries underprovide local public goods in the absence of a residence-based capital tax, Nash equilibria are efficient in the two-tax cases if residence-based capital taxes but no source-based capital or else wage taxes are available. Moreover, aggregate production is situated on the world production frontier when the set of fiscal instruments is unrestricted.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 347
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Economic Integration
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eggert, Wolfgang
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eggert, Wolfgang
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 1997
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