Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the impact of international capital mobility on redistributive capital taxation and on lobbying activities by interest groups. It employs a model where different capital endowments lead to a conflict between households concerning their most preferred capital tax rate. Three main results are derived: First, redistributive source based capital taxes or subsidies decline as international tax competition intensifies. Second, lobbying activities of certain interest groups may explain international differences in the capital tax rate. Third, capital mobility may lead to declining lobbying activities of interest groups and thus may be welfare increasing for all households.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Year: 1996 ; Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Subject: Tax competition ; interest groups ; redistribution

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lorz, Jens Oliver
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) ; ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 1996

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47109
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET