Arbeitspapier

Proper consistency

Proper consistency is defined by the properties that each player takes all opponent strategies into account (is cautious) and deems one opponent strategy to be infinitely more likely than another if the opponent prefers the one to the other (respects preferences). When there is common certain belief of proper consistency, a most preferred strategy is properly rationalizable. Any strategy used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable. Only strategies that lead to the backward induction outcome is properly rationalizable in the strategic form of a generic perfect information game. Proper rationalizability can be used to test the robustness of inductive procedures.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 1999,31

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Spieltheorie
Rationale Erwartung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Asheim, Geir B.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
1999

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Asheim, Geir B.
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1999

Other Objects (12)