Sick Pay Reforms and Health Status in a Unionised Labour Market

Arbeitspapier

We theoretically analyse the effects of sick pay and employees’ health on collective bargaining, assuming that individuals determine absence optimally. If sick pay is set by the government and not paid for by firms, it induces the trade union to lower wages. This mitigates the positive impact on absence. Moreover, a union may oppose higher sick pay if it reduces labour supply sufficiently. Better employee health tends to foster wage demands. If the union determines both wages and sick pay, we identify situations in which it will substitute wages for sick pay because adverse absence effects can be mitigated.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6177

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Health Insurance, Public and Private ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
• Thema: absence ; employment ; sick pay ; trade union ; wage determination

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Goerke, Laszlo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149264
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ